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Abstract: This paper tests whether marriage to a native affects the probability that an immigrant is employed. We 
provide a theoretical background which explains how marriage to a native may positively or negatively affect an 
immigrant’s employment probability. Utilizing the 2000 U.S. Census, we first look at the effect of cross-nativity 
marriages on employment using a linear probability model. Then, we estimate a two stage least squares model 
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  11 Introduction   
 
Does marriage to a native increase the employment probability of immigrants? In this paper, we aim to address 
this question paying particular attention to whether the relationship between intermarriage and labor market 
attachment is in fact causal.   
Using Australian data, Meng and Gregory (2005) find that an immigrant’s marriage to a native has a positive 
effect on earnings even after controlling for the endogeneity of the marriage decision. In contrast, using U.S. data, 
Kantarevic (2004) finds that taking into account selection issues, the positive effect of marriage to a native on 
earnings assimilation disappears.  
There are many reasons why it may be important to analyze the effect of intermarriage separately on earnings 
and employment rates. In fact, one potential reason for the discrepancy in the earnings literature is that marriage to a 
native may have differing effects on employment rates in the Australia and the U.S.  Conditional on being employed 
before and after marriage to a native, earnings in both countries may increase when immigrants marry natives. 
However, because earnings data is only available for workers, then it may appear as though marriage to a native 
decreases earnings if marriage to a native increases employment rates of low skilled immigrants. Although dealing 
with differential selection patterns in Australia and the U.S. is beyond the scope of this paper, we will examine the 
relationship between intermarriage and employment in the U.S. Studying the employment patterns of immigrants is 
also important because employment aids in the assimilation process to the U.S., increases earnings, decreases public 
transfers, and improves public attitudes toward immigrants (Chiswick et al., 1997; Hanson et al., 2005).     
This is the first paper to examine the effects of intermarriage on employment. Using 2000 U.S. Census data, we 
find that even after controlling for a number of human capital variables, a foreign born male’s marriage to a native 
increases the probability that he is employed by approximately six percentage points.   
Because marriage to a native and employment may be jointly determined by unobserved characteristics, 
intermarriage can be viewed as an endogenous variable. For example, the foreign born that are more assimilated 
may be both more likely to marry a native and be employed, thus biasing the coefficient on intermarriage upward. 
Alternatively, it may be that the most hardworking immigrants are more likely to marry immigrants and so the 
intermarriage coefficient may be biased downward. To deal with this endogeneity issue, we adopt a two stage 
estimation strategy using local marriage market conditions as an instrument for intermarriage. More specifically, we 
  2use the percentage of women in the foreign born male’s age group and metropolitan statistical area (MSA) that is 
foreign born as an instrument for his marriage to a native.   
We find that after instrumenting, the effect of marriage to a native, not only remains positive and statistically 
significant, but increases in magnitude. This suggests that it is the immigrants that are less likely to work that are 
more likely to marry natives. When taking this into account, marriage to a native increases the probability of 
employment by approximately eleven percentage points.     
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical background while 
Section 3 describes the data. The empirical models and discussion of results are presented in Section 4.  Section 5 
concludes and suggests policy implications. 
 
2  Theoretical Background and Empirical Approach  
 
There are various ways in which marriage to native could affect an immigrant’s probability of being employed.  
As suggested by Meng and Gregory (2005), the native born spouses of immigrants could improve immigrants’ 
language acquisition, learning of local customs, and knowledge of local labor market conditions. Because the 
foreign born typically have less information about local labor markets, they may be forced to experiment with more 
jobs and this could result in more unemployment spells (Chiswick et al., 1997). If the native born and their networks 
have and share more information about the availability of different types of jobs, then their immigrant spouses may 
be better able to find good employment matches. Also, for the many illegal immigrants in the U.S., marriage to a 
native brings with it the right to legal employment. By opening up job opportunities to immigrants, the likelihood of 
their employment increases. 
There are also many reasons why marriage to a native may decrease employment rates of immigrants. First, 
even though the native born may have more information about high skill jobs, these jobs may be irrelevant for low 
skilled immigrants. For many of the immigrants at the margin between being employment and unemployment, 
immigrant networks may in fact prove more useful than native networks in finding low skill jobs. Moreover, 
because migrant communities tend to be more socially cohesive (Munshi, 2003), marriage to an immigrant may 
bring with it more contacts than marriage to a native. Thus, marriage to another immigrant may increase the 
employment probabilities of immigrants.  
  3Also, as discussed above, for many of the foreign born, marriage to a native brings with it the right to legal 
employment. Immigrants that are legally employed for a certain amount of time are eligible for unemployment 
insurance and other government transfers such as disability insurance and social security income. These government 
transfers have been shown to increase the duration of unemployment spells (Moffitt, 1985) and increase the 
probability that people exit the labor force (Moffitt, 2002).  
The native-born spouses of immigrants may have more knowledge of the existence of government transfer 
programs as well as the rules and procedures necessary to qualify for them. Again, this would suggest that marriage 
to a native may decrease the probability of being employed. Also, if native-born spouses are more likely to work and 
conditional on working, are more likely to have higher earnings, then they may be better able to finance their 
immigrant spouse’s job search thereby extending unemployment spells.   
It is difficult to empirically decipher whether marriage to a native increases or decreases employment rates of 
immigrants. Estimates obtained from a simple least squares approach should be interpreted with caution because 
marriage to a native is certainly not exogenous. Many of the skills that are valued in the U.S. labor market are also 
valued in the marriage market for native born spouses. Examples include language ability, knowledge of American 
customs, and even physical beauty as suggested by Kantarevic (2004). Also, if the more ambitious immigrants know 
that native networks are important in finding good jobs, they may surround themselves with natives and thus 
increase the probability of both finding a native spouse and a job. All of these possibilities suggest that the ordinary 
least squares estimate of the effect of marriage to a native on employment overestimates its true effect.  
In contrast, it may be that even though immigrants with observable characteristics such as education and 
English fluency are more likely to marry natives and be employed, it is the immigrants with unobservable 
characteristics such as ambition and diligence that are both more likely to marry other immigrants and be employed. 
Thus, the ordinary least squares estimate of the effect of marriage to a native on employment could be biased 
downward.   
We address these biases taking two main approaches. First, to take into account the possibility that certain 
ethnic groups may, for unobservable reasons, be more (or less) likely to both marry a native and be employed, we 
include country of birth fixed effects in the empirical specification. Second, as is more common in the literature 
(Meng and Gregory, 2005; Kantarevic, 2004; and Angrist, 2001), we use marriage market conditions as an 
  4instrument for marriage decisions. Specifically, we instrument for an immigrant male’s marriage to a native using 
the percentage of women in his age group living in his metropolitan statistical area that are foreign born.   
3 
                                                
The Data  
 
The paper uses the 5 percent Public Use Sample of the 2000 U.S. Census as reported by the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS).
1  We consider a sample of married (spouse present) foreign born males who are 
between the ages of 18 and 64. We drop immigrants who are still in education. In order to restrict our analysis to 
immigrants that were actually exposed to the U.S. marriage market, we drop those immigrants that arrived in the 
U.S. after the age of 18.  We also drop from the sample immigrants from English speaking countries. Lastly, 
because our instrumental variable relies on cross-metropolitan variation, we keep only the immigrants that reside in 
identifiable metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).   
An immigrant is defined as a person who was born outside of the U.S. while a native is a person who was born 
in the U.S.  For the purposes of this study, people born in outlying areas of U.S. such as Puerto Rico and the Virgin 
Islands are considered immigrants, but those born abroad to U.S. parents are dropped from the analysis. It is 
important to keep in mind that, using these definitions, many of the natives that immigrants marry share the same 
ethnic background and could even be native born children of immigrants from the same country of birth. 
 Approximately 34 percent of the immigrant men in our sample are married to a native female. Our dependent 
variable takes the value of one if an immigrant is employed. An immigrant is considered employed if he has a job, 
regardless of whether he is working. Immigrants in the armed forces are considered employed. The baseline set of 
controls used in the analysis are age and its second order polynomial to capture the effect of experience, educational 
achievement, presence of children in the household, whether the person is a veteran, region dummies, residence in 
the central city or outside the central city, and a measure of health. Health is measured using a dummy variable 
equal to one if the immigrant has a disability which prevents, limits, or causes difficulty in working.   
We also have specifications which control for measures of assimilation such as English language fluency and 
years in the U.S.  The English fluency dummy variable is equal to one if the immigrant speaks only English, speaks 
English very well or well.  The variable equals zero if the immigrant either does not speak English well or does not 
 
1 The data set is publicly available at http://usa.ipums.org/usa/. Details on how the variables were constructed are 
available upon request.   
  5speak English at all.  In some specifications, we also control for the size of the immigrant group which is measured 
as the percentage of people living in the immigrant’s MSA born in the same country as the immigrant.    
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of all of the variables used in the analysis separately by marriage type. 
However, immigrant males married to natives have employment rates 11.5 percentage points higher than immigrants 
married to other immigrants. This could be explained by the fact that intermarried males are 2.8 years older, are 
more educated, and have higher English fluency rates. Immigrants married to natives have been in the U.S. 7.8 years 
more than immigrants married to other immigrants. Immigrants that marry natives are also more likely to have been 
in the army, less likely to have children, and are more likely to live outside central cities. Also, just as we may 
expect, immigrants living in MSAs with a higher the ratio of immigrant women relative to all women are less likely 
to be in cross-nativity marriages.   
There is also country of birth variation in the tendency of immigrants to marry natives. Central Americans, 
Mexicans, and Asians are more likely to be in same-nativity marriages than cross-nativity marriages. Meanwhile, 
Europeans, Africans, South Americans and people from the Middle East are more likely to be married to a native 
than to an immigrant. Immigrants from the West Indies are just as likely to be in cross-nativity as in same-nativity 
marriages.  
Part of the reason why immigrant employment rates differ by marriage type may be related to the characteristics 
of the spouses. Compared to the foreign born spouses of immigrants, native born spouses are older, more educated, 
have higher English fluency rates, and are more likely to be employed. Although we will not directly control for 
these spousal characteristics in the empirical analysis, it is important to keep them in mind when interpreting our 
results.   
4  Empirical Specification and Results 
4.1  Linear Probability Model  
 
The primary empirical specification in the analysis takes the form 
ijk j ijk ijk ijk Inter X y ε γ β β β + + + + = 2 1 0  
  6where   is equal to one if person i with country of birth j living in city k is employed and zero otherwise.  The 
regressor of interest,  , is a dummy variable for marriage to a native, while
ijk y
Inter X is a vector of the individual-
level controls that we outlined in Section 3.  Country of birth fixed effects are captured byγ .  
Table 2 presents estimates of the effects of cross-nativity marriage on employment rates of immigrants using 
several different models. The first column contains the estimates of a specification with intermarriage along with the 
usual controls used in the employment literature. Coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with 
those in the existing literature. Compared to immigrants with no schooling, immigrants with more education are 
more likely to be employed, and higher degrees are associated with higher employment rates. Immigrants with a 
disability are less likely to be employed as are veterans and immigrants living in central cities.  Inconsistent with the 
literature is the finding that immigrant males with children are less likely to be employed than those without 
children. However, this effect seems to be driven by selection issues as it disappears in models which control for 
country of birth. Overall, the results suggest that an immigrant’s marriage to a native increases the probability that 
he is employed by six percentage points.   
This relationship between marriage to a native and employment rates could be driven by differences in 
assimilation rates of immigrants.  Immigrants that are more assimilated may be both more likely to marry a native 
and find a good job match. To control for immigrant assimilation, we add in column 2, the English fluency variable 
as well as years since immigration to the U.S. As expected, these two variables decrease the effect of cross-nativity 
marriage by 1.2 percentage points, but the coefficient remains positive and statistically significant. This is especially 
noteworthy given that improvement of English language skills is one of the mechanisms through which marriage to 
native could improve labor market outcomes of immigrants. The fact that the coefficient on marriage to a native 
remains positive and statistically significant suggests that whether or not natives improve fluency rates of their 
immigrant spouses, they also provide other benefits in the labor market.   
Even when including the standard measures of human capital and assimilation in the specification, the 
coefficient on intermarriage may be biased if immigrants residing in ethnic enclaves are less likely to marry natives 
and have unobservable characteristics which decrease the probability of being employed. Moreover, immigrants in 
ethnic groups with more substantial cultural differences with Americans may be less likely to both marry natives and 
fare well in the labor market. To deal with both of these concerns, column 3 adds the size of the immigrant group to 
the specification along with ethnicity fixed effects. As expected, immigrants residing around many other immigrants 
  7with the same country of birth are less likely to be employed. However, the coefficient on intermarriage decreases 
by only a half of a percentage point and remains positive and statistically significant when the size of the immigrant 
group and country of birth fixed effects are added to the specification.   
 
4.2   Instrumental variable estimates  
 
The problem with these estimates is that marriage to a native is not a random event. Even when controlling for 
education, years in the U.S., language ability, size of ethnic group and country of birth, immigrants that choose to 
marry natives may have unobservable characteristics which increase or decrease employment rates. We address this 
endogeneity issue by instrumenting cross nativity marriages using the ratio of immigrant women over all women in 
MSA-age group cells.
2   
As suggested by Becker’s (1981) work on marriage markets, the greater the availability of spouses of a certain 
type, the more likely a person is to marry someone of that type. First stage regression results are shown in column 4 
of Table 2. As predicted by the theory, an increase in the percent of females that are foreign born in a man’s 
marriage market decreases the probability that he marries a native, even when controlling for the percent of the 
MSA born in his country of birth.   
Second stage results are shown in column 5 of Table 2. The coefficients suggest that when the endogeneity of 
the cross-nativity marriage decision is taken into account, marriage to a native increases the probability of 
employment by 11.3 percentage points. Interestingly, the instrumental variables estimate is greater than the least 
squares estimate. This is consistent with the explanation that holding constant variables such education, language 
ability, and country of birth, immigrants that marry other immigrants have more favorable unobservable 
characteristics than immigrants that marry natives. Since the least squares estimate does not take into account any 
unobserved ambition and diligence among the immigrants that tend to marry other immigrants, marriage to a native 
appears to be less beneficial than it really is.   
 
                                                 
2 The MSA-age group cells are constructed from 283 MSAs and the following nine age groups: 18-22, 23-27, 28-32, 
33-37, 38-42, 43-47, 48-52, 53-57 and 58-64.  
  85 Conclusions 
 
Drawing on U.S. Census data, this paper shows that an immigrant’s marriage to a native increases the 
probability that he is employed. Various techniques were used to address the endogeneity of the intermarriage 
decision. First, measures of immigrant human capital and assimilation such as education, language ability and years 
in the U.S. were included in the baseline specification. To control for the possibility that unobserved ethnic 
attributes affect success in both the marriage and labor markets, country of birth fixed effects were added to the 
specification. Also, since residing in an ethnic enclave could either hinder employment opportunities by slowing 
assimilation or increase the number of job offers through ethnic networks, size of immigrant group was added to the 
specification. Lastly, to control for any remaining omitted variables, marriage to a native was instrumented with the 
percent of all immigrant females in MSA-age group cells that is foreign born. In all specifications, marriage to a 
native had a positive and significant effect on the probability of being employed.   
There are many possible explanations for this positive relationship between marriage to a native and 
employment probability. When immigrants marry a native, they marry a teacher of English as well as of U.S. 
customs and traditions. They also acquire a network most likely composed of many natives that are able to provide 
information about local labor market conditions and job opportunities. Because marriage to a native basically 
guarantees legal status in the U.S., it can open up the job opportunities of illegal immigrants. Moreover, as discussed 
in Section 2, the native-born spouses of immigrants have very different characteristics than the foreign-born spouses 
of immigrants. It could be these characteristics, as opposed to nativity per se, that affect the employment 
probabilities of immigrants. Disentangling the mechanisms through which marriage to a native improves labor 
market outcomes is beyond the scope of this paper, but is an area ripe for future research.   
If the native-born spouses of immigrants along with their networks share information about local job market 
opportunities and act as teachers of English and U.S. culture, then policies can be made to encourage these types of 
marriages. For example, policy-makers may consider limiting visas to the foreign born spouses of immigrants.  
Given that restricting marriage choice may be seen as unethical, policies can be made to directly provide the services 
given by the native-born spouses of immigrants. English classes and job search strategies may be offered to new 
immigrants. Although clear policy recommendations cannot be made without knowing the mechanisms through 
which marriage to a native affects labor market outcomes, our results do point to ways in which policies could 
potentially aid in the immigrant assimilation process.   
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis.  
Notes: Figures are weighted. 
   Cross Nativity Couples    Same Nativity Couples    All 
   Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
   Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
In  labor  force  0.894  0.308   0.790  0.407   0.825  0.380 
Spouse in  labor force  0.681  0.466    0.509  0.500    0.567  0.495 
Employment  0.868  0.338   0.753  0.431   0.792  0.406 
Spouse’s  employment  0.650  0.477   0.463  0.499   0.526  0.499 
Unemployment  0.026  0.160   0.036  0.187   0.033  0.178 
Spouse’s  unemployment  0.031  0.172   0.046  0.210   0.041  0.198 
Age  39.205  10.315   36.430  9.449   37.368  9.838 
Spouse’s  age  37.247  10.175   34.579  9.384   35.481  9.741 
No school completed  0.013  0.113    0.053  0.225    0.040  0.195 
Spouse’s no school completed  0.003  0.056    0.050  0.219    0.034  0.182 
Less than or up to 12th grade, no diploma  0.205  0.404    0.429  0.494    0.353  0.478 
Spouse’s less then or up to 12
th grade, no diploma  0.134  0.341    0.411  0.492    0.318  0.466 
High school, or GED  0.209  0.407    0.193  0.395    0.199  0.399 
Spouse’s high school, or GED  0.257  0.437    0.213  0.409    0.228  0.419 
Some college, no degree (associate degree)  0.277  0.448    0.173  0.378    0.208  0.406 
Spouse’s  some  college  0.330  0.470   0.185  0.388   0.234  0.423 
Bachelors Degree and above (Masters, Professional, PhD)   0.295  0.456    0.152  0.359    0.200  0.400 
Spouse’s Degree and above (Masters, Professional, PhD)  0.275  0.447    0.141  0.348    0.186  0.389 
English  fluency  0.950  0.217   0.768  0.422   0.830  0.376 
Spouse’s English fluency  0.986  0.119    0.646  0.478    0.761  0.427 
Years in the U.S.  30.826  12.126   23.051  10.673   25.680  11.775 
Own children in the household  0.743  0.437    0.822  0.382    0.795  0.403 
Work  difficulty  0.114  0.317   0.235  0.424   0.194  0.395 
Veteran  0.191  0.393   0.079  0.270   0.117  0.322 
Size of immigrant group in MSA  0.025  0.040    0.046  0.044    0.039  0.044 
In metro area, central city  0.203  0.402    0.282  0.450    0.255  0.436 
In metro area, outside central city  0.441  0.496    0.393  0.488    0.409  0.492 
Europe  0.324  0.468   0.080  0.271   0.162  0.369 
Central  America  0.041  0.199   0.067  0.249   0.058  0.234 
South  America  0.050  0.217   0.038  0.191   0.042  0.201 
Mexico  0.255  0.436   0.480  0.500   0.404  0.491 
West  Indies  0.077  0.267   0.077  0.266   0.077  0.266 
Asia  0.126  0.331   0.171  0.376   0.156  0.363 
Middle  East  0.023  0.152   0.016  0.126   0.019  0.136 
Africa  0.021  0.143   0.009  0.095   0.013  0.113 
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Table 2. Results from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two Stage Least Squares Models (2SLS).  
 OLS  OLS  OLS  IV  (2SLS) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 Employment  Employment  Employment  Cross  nativity 
marriage 
Employment 


























































































































Region dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 







































Instrument: Immigrant women/all women  No  No  No  -0.440 
(0.013)** 
No 
Observations 89,394  89,394 89,394  89,394  89,394 
Notes. Standard errors are robust and clustered on (MSA× age group) cells.    
          + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
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